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CULTURE, HISTORY AND TRAUMATIC MEMORY: AN 
INTERPRETATION1
Allan Young2
Abstract: Efforts to investigate psychiatric disorders across cultures routinely ignore a pervasive cultural influence, namely 
the culture of psychiatry. This article focuses on how the culture of psychiatry affects our understanding of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is diagnosed by means of standardized symptom criteria and scales. Yet it is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon. The illusion of homogeneity is fostered by a categorical conception of traumatic memory that homogenizes 
posttraumatic memories and erects an obstacle to investigating the disorder’s historical nature, clinical phenomenology, and 
neuro-physiology and neuro-anatomy. I illustrate this process, via an epidemic of PTSD that now affects a quarter of a mil-
lion American war veterans. 
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Cultura, historia y memoria traumática: una interpretación
Resumen: Los esfuerzos para investigar trastornos psiquiátricos a través de las culturas, por lo general ignoran una frecuente 
influencia cultural, que es la propia cultura de psiquiatría. Este artículo se enfoca en cómo la cultura de psiquiatría afecta 
nuestro entendimiento del trastorno de estrés post-traumático (TEPP). El TEPP se diagnostica mediante criterios de síntomas 
y escalas. No obstante, es un fenómeno heterogéneo. La ilusión de homogeneidad es fomentada por una concepción categórica 
de memoria de trauma que homogeneiza las memorias post-trauma y crea un obstáculo para investigar la historia natural 
del trastorno, la fenomenología clínica, neurofisiología y neuroanatomía. Ilustro este proceso por medio de una epidemia de 
TEPP que afecta a un cuarto de millón de veteranos de guerra en Norteamérica.
Palabras clave: trastorno de estrés postraumático, salud mental, cultura, psiquiatría
Cultura, história e memória traumática: uma interpretação
Resumo: Os esforços para investigar transtornos psiquiátricos em diferentes culturas rotineiramente ignoram a difusa  influência 
cultural, principalmente a cultura da psiquiatria. Este artigo enfoca como a cultura da psiquiatria afeta a nossa compreensão 
do transtorno de estresse pós-traumático (PTSD). PTSD é diagnosticado por meio de critérios de sintomas padronizados e 
escalas. No entanto, é um fenômeno heterogêneo. A ilusão de homogeneidade é fomentada por uma concepção categórica da 
memória traumática que homogeniza as memórias pós-traumáticas e erige um obstáculo para investigar a natureza da desordem 
histórica, a fenomenologia clínica, e a neurofisiologia  e neuroanatomia. Explico este processo por meio de uma epidemia de 
PTSD que atualmente afeta um quarto de um milhão de veteranos de guerra americanos.
Palavras-chave: transtorno de estresse pós-traumático, saúde mental, cultura, psiquiatria
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Every diagnostic classification has a history, but 
PTSD is historical in an additional sense. The en-
gagement between trauma and history over the 
last two centuries comprises multiple ‘episodes’ 
that follow a common pattern. Each episode 
started with an event of encompassing violence 
and an epidemic of posttraumatic casualties. The 
epidemics were sources of controversy regard-
ing the numbers affected, their etiology, impair-
ment, and differential diagnosis; the distribution 
of culpability and obligation for these casualties; 
the economic and social costs of fulfilling those 
obligations; and the appropriate intervention 
strategies.  Resources were mobilized (manpower, 
technologies, facilities) for managing casualties, 
claimants, and research. In each episode, a dis-
tinctive assemblage emerged, colored by national 
medical traditions, institutional cultures, and 
popular attitudes. Now familiar syndromes —
shellshock, PTSD, mild traumatic brain injury 
(mTBI), Gulf War Syndrome, second-generation 
Holocaust trauma, etc.— and subjectivities (vic-
tims’ self-awareness, and self-representations) 
incubated within these cultural-historical assem-
blages. PTSD is incorrectly perceived as a time-
less phenomenon. It as a ‘form of life’, shaped by 
culture, historical contingency, and locality.
Malleable Memories
The structure of PTSD has remained unchanged 
from DSM-III onward. In plain English, an event 
creates a memory that is immediately or belatedly 
distressful, repetitive, and intrusive (involuntary). 
Remembering traumatic memories mobilizes an 
autonomic nervous system response, resulting in 
difficulty sleeping, irritability, exaggerated startle 
response, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrat-
ing, and motor restlessness. The patient adapts to 
the distressful memory and consequent arousal 
through symptomatic forms of avoidance and 
numbing. In short, we are talking about a classic 
neurotic adaptation.
The earliest descriptions of memory-driven post-
traumatic disorders date to the 1870s and1880s, 
and refer to cases involving pseudo-neurological 
symptoms. Jean-Martin Charcot referred to these 
memories as “mental parasites,” and this concep-
tion recurs in the writings of Pierre Janet and Sig-
mund Freud on traumatic neurosis and traumatic 
What is PTSD?
The question is straightforward but best ap-
proached indirectly, through PTSD’s most im-
portant manifestations:
1. DSM and ICD symptom lists, regarded as suf-
ficient for making differential diagnoses. 
2. ‘Pure’ cases: flesh-and-blood individuals whose 
symptoms are unambiguous, overt (not simply 
inferred), and uncompromised by co-morbid dis-
orders such as depression, anxiety disorder, and 
alcohol or chemical substance abuse. 
3. Cases in which the distinctiveness of symptoms 
is complicated by co-morbid disorders and con-
testable traumatic events. The majority of research 
on PTSD has been conducted on the ‘chronic’ 
subtype, where symptoms have lasted six months 
or longer, and the great majority of chronic cases 
correspond to this third kind.
4. Epidemiological populations, in which cases 
are aggregated and symptoms decomposed to 
plot distributions and correlations. 
The four manifestations are conventionally as-
sumed to be congruent, but the assumption is 
problematic. In reality, the manifestations are 
connected by “family resemblances”: they overlap 
rather than converge. The pervasive mispercep-
tion is a consequence of the culture of psychiat-
ric science. Resistance to the idea that psychiatry 
might have a culture is grounded in a false di-
chotomy that separates psychiatric science from 
psychiatric culture. My use of the term ‘culture’ 
refers to a system of tacit meanings, dispositions 
(values, sentiments), pragmatics (ways of know-
ing what to do or say next), and self-confirming 
outcomes in research and the clinic. The common 
understanding is that culture and psychiatry are 
linked only externally: e.g. the idea that the post-
traumatic syndrome is represented differently in 
different cultures, each reflecting the local idioms 
of distress. The alternative possibility is ignored: 
the existence of a culture intrinsic to the opera-
tions of psychiatric science and the manifesta-
tions of traumatic memory. 
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Factitious memory is often described as a form 
of self-deception, but it equally tokens un-self-
conscious efforts aimed at salvaging or rebuilding 
the individual’s sense of self. Number two is ficti-
tious traumatic memory or malingering. By defi-
nition, a malingerer is aware of dissimulating and 
there is no self-deception. In practice, the bound-
ary between fictitious and factitious memories is 
porous, and easily transgressed via autosuggestion 
—a subject of intense interest to trauma doctors a 
century ago, but for the wrong reasons no longer 
considered interesting.
To summarize, I have cited five kinds of traumatic 
memory: iconic memory, memory of the future, 
Nachträglichkeit, factious memory, and malinger-
ing. In each instance, memories are represented as 
if they were object-like things, stored in a library-
like mental location, waiting to be retrieved. An 
idea still popular among PTSD researchers is that 
traumatic memories are also uniquely ‘indelible’, 
analogous to videotapes and DVDs. Yet there 
is no compelling empirical evidence that trau-
matic memories are unlike other memories in 
this respect(1). All episodic memories are intrinsi-
cally malleable. In his famous 1932 monograph, 
Remembering, the British psychologist Fredrick 
Bartlett suggested that memories enter conscious-
ness via a process, in which mnemonic traces of 
an experience are re-assembled, recalibrated, up-
dated, and re-schematized. Re-assembly draws on 
semantic memory (substantive knowledge) and 
fragments of other, associated episodic memories, 
and affected by the individual’s mental state and 
life situation. Thus memories —the product that 
enters consciousness— are intrinsically malleable. 
This process has been intensively studied during 
the intervening years. Cognitive neuroscience 
portrays malleability as evidence of memory’s 
evolutionary origin and function. Memories of 
the past are simultaneously memories for the fu-
ture: a means of enhancing the organism’s ability 
to respond to new situations, rather than a medi-
um for providing faithful photocopies of the past. 
Memories provide the templates we depend on 
for interpreting novel and ambiguous events, but 
the templates are themselves reshaped for each 
occasion(2,3). 
neurasthenia. One of the earliest descriptions of a 
clinical case concerns a Parisian identified as “Le-
log.” According to Le-log, he was knocked down 
in the street by a runaway horse and wagon, and 
the wagon wheels ran over his thighs. Le-log lost 
consciousness: on awakening, he discovered livid 
bruises across his thighs and that his legs were 
paralyzed. Le-log was then brought to Charcot, 
a celebrated neurologist. The account given in 
most histories of PTSD stops at this point. But 
there is more to the story, for onlookers informed 
Charcot that Le-log collapsed before the wagon 
reached him and the wheels did not roll over his 
legs. Charcot conclusion was that Le-log’s recol-
lection was not a memory of a past event but a 
memory of the future, anticipating an event he 
believed was going to happen. When, on recover-
ing consciousness, Le-log saw his bruises, his fears 
were confirmed. Charcot’s conclusion was that 
memories of this sort might be as toxic as the real 
thing, i.e. memories of the past. If reliable eye-
witnesses are present, there is no problem distin-
guishing between the two kinds of memory. Oth-
erwise, a physician must depend on his intuition. 
During World War One, German army physi-
cians, including Max Nonne and Fritz Kaufmann, 
claimed that most cases of traumatic hysteria af-
fecting front-line soldiers were the consequence 
of memories of the future. Sigmund Freud iden-
tified a related etiological pathway, referring to 
it as Nachträglichkeit. A harmless event is belat-
edly transformed into a troubling memory when 
its traumatic meaning is discovered. The path-
way to this toxic memory leads from the onset 
of non-specific symptoms to the discovery of an 
event initially misunderstood as non-toxic, thus 
reversing the pathway that is typical of traumatic 
neuroses. The remembered experience is more 
than an attribution: it is not simply recalled, but 
actively re-experienced in intrusive thoughts, im-
ages, and dreams, acquiring the emotional power 
and psychological salience of a traumatic event.
There are two additional ways in which the iconic 
traumatic memory is imitated. Number one is 
factitious memory, where someone develops an 
intense psychological identification with a bor-
rowed or imagined etiological event; more com-
monly, it is identified with a grossly distorted 
representation of an autobiographical event. 
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December 2004, the Chicago Sun-Times reported 
significant disparities in PTSD compensation for 
Illinois veterans and recipients elsewhere. Illinois 
ranked last among the states, and its congressional 
delegation wanted the Dept. of Veterans Affairs 
to explain the discrepancy. Its report, published 
in 2007, outlined the national context: disabil-
ity rolls for PTSD grew from 120,265 recipients 
@ $1.7 billion (1999) to 215,871 @ $4.3 billion 
(2004)(5:vii). The trend has continued: by 2014, 
over 650,000 veterans were receiving compensa-
tion for PTSD. This development is explained in 
part by the massive expansion of the operational 
theater in the Middle East following the Gulf War 
and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
adding two million more US veterans by 2015. 
Additional factors favoured this trend. In 2010, it 
became significantly easier for a veteran to qualify 
for PTSD diagnosis and a ‘service-connected’ dis-
ability claim. The claim requires evidence of an 
experience (a ‘stressor’) sufficient to precipitate 
the posttraumatic syndrome. From 1980 (DSM-
III) to 2010, stressors were limited to witnessing 
or experiencing traumatic events. In 2010, the 
VA expanded the range of stressors to include a 
victim’s fear or expectation of an imminent trau-
ma-level event. In other words, it was no longer 
necessary to suffer or witness traumatic violence 
directly. In 2012, the requirement that claimants 
document physical proximity to stressors was set 
aside. Following these changes, PTSD claims rose 
60% to over 150,000 per annum, and the ap-
proval rate increased from 55% to 74%(6).
A quarter million Vietnam War veterans were 
added to PTSD disability rolls after 2001. In 
most cases, this means a 40-year delay between 
the veterans’ traumatic events and the diagnosis 
of their PTSD syndrome. Where the delay be-
tween traumatic event and onset of symptoms 
exceeds 6 months, cases are considered to be “de-
layed expression” or “delayed onset” PTSD. The 
period that precedes the onset of PTSD in these 
cases can be symptom-free or characterized by 
unexplained symptoms (somatic, behavioural). 
When traumatic experiences are subsequently re-
called, the previously unexplained symptoms are 
characteristically recognized (post hoc) as post-
traumatic. 
The malleability of memory is illustrated by a 
seminal study of American veterans (n=59) of 
the first Gulf War(4). The men were interviewed 
one month after returning from the theater of op-
erations, and re-interviewed two years later.  On 
both occasions, the men completed a 19-item 
questionnaire keyed to their combat experiences. 
In the second interview, 70% of the men report-
ed experiencing at least one combat event that 
had not been reported in the initial interview. 
The most commonly reported newly remem-
bered events were “bizarre disfiguration of bod-
ies as a result of wounds,” “seeing others killed or 
wounded,” and  “extreme threat to your personal 
safety.” The researchers emphasize that the ma-
jority of newly remembered experiences concern 
“objectively described severe events,” rather than 
“subjectively evaluated experiences.” The second 
interview also provided evidence of forgetting: 
46% of the respondents failed to report one or 
more of the events that they had reported one 
month after returning home.
Researchers traced the previously unreported ex-
periences were traced to two sources. First, dur-
ing the interval between interviews, men typically 
viewed media accounts of the military actions in 
which they participated, and had conversations 
with other veterans about their Gulf War experi-
ences. The images and narratives absorbed during 
this period were a source of factitious memories. 
“(I)ndividuals who became increasingly symp-
tomatic over time unknowingly exaggerated their 
memory for trauma events as a way to under-
stand or explain their emerging psychopatholo-
gy”(4:176). And researchers pointed to a positive 
correlation between number of PTSD symptoms 
and number of new events reported by the par-
ticipants in the study. 
The malleability or fluidity of traumatic memory 
is the outward manifestation of an underlying 
neuropsychological process, connecting manifes-
tations of traumatic memory —iconic, factitious, 
fictitious— that penetrate into consciousness 
over the course of time. 
A Puzzling Epidemic
US military veterans comprise the largest global 
population currently diagnosed with PTSD. In 
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showing that most claimants for PTSD disabil-
ity awards are “veterans whose limited vocational 
skills reduce their ability to make a decent liv-
ing”(12:524). In other words, the epidemic is a 
product of malingering, a conscious deception 
of others with the goal of obtaining a pension or 
other forms of secondary gain.
The malingering thesis is consistent with the 
findings of the VA’s Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral. Patients diagnosed with PTSD typically get 
worse (more symptomatic), but continue to at-
tend treatment sessions. The disability rating (and 
therefore compensation) increased over time, un-
til reaching a maximum (100 percent), at which 
point the typical patient “sought less treatment 
for the condition. … The average decline in visits 
was 82 percent... (While) mental health visits de-
clined, non-mental health visits did not”(5:52).
PTSD is a perfect medium for malingering. Key 
symptoms such as intrusive images and disturb-
ing dreams are subjective, self-reported and easily 
faked. And knowledgeable malingerers are able 
to produce putative biomarkers such as elevated 
heart rate and abnormal responses to Stroop Tests. 
Interest in malingering has waxed and waned: 
during the late 19th century it focused on com-
pensation claims for injuries suffered in railway 
accidents; interest reemerged during World War 
I, when shellshock symptoms provided soldiers a 
way to escape from the trenches. Popular inter-
est in malingering revived again in the 1990s, at-
tracted by florid narratives based on “recovered 
memory.” Malingering received relatively little 
attention in psychiatric journals immediately 
prior to the publication of DSM-III – averaging 
just two or three papers per annum. Following 
the introduction of a PTSD diagnosis (1980) 
and redefinition of malingering as the product of 
false or exaggerated symptoms, motivated by ex-
ternal incentives (1987), publications multiplied. 
By 2010, the annual average hovered around 
100(13:296). 
Malingering is interpreted variously, as either a 
categorical or dynamic phenomenon. The DSMs 
provide psychiatry with a categorical phenom-
enon: a standard for dividing symptoms into false 
and authentic. The dynamic perspective sees ma-
lingering as a psychological process, pairing he 
Frueh et al.(7) analyzed data on 747 veterans 
treated in VA primary care clinics, and structured 
clinical interviews collected from a sub-sample 
of 150 veterans. Cases included current PTSD, 
sub-threshold PTSD (individual symptoms that 
could be attributed to a traumatic stressor), and 
lifetime PTSD (associated with varied stressors in 
the past). In over 90% of cases, onset of PTSD 
symptoms had occurred within one month of the 
war-time trauma, and no onset occurred later than 
six years post-trauma. The inconsistency between 
these circumstances and the post-2001 explosion 
of late-onset PTSD among disability claimants is 
puzzling given that these veterans had continuous 
access to PTSD diagnosis and treatment from the 
VA since the 1980s. 
One might hypothesize that the neurological 
changes that affect aging brains have contributed 
to this surge of late-onset PTSD.  The idea here 
is that soldiers were exposed to traumatic stress-
ors in Vietnam, but could regulate emotions and 
employ adaptive coping responses, notably sup-
pression, after returning to the USA. Cognitive 
decline linked to aging, specifically the weaken-
ing of functional connections between prefron-
tal cortex, hippocampus, and other parts of the 
brain, would reduce the veteran’s capacity to in-
hibit intrusive traumatic memories and regulate 
emotions. The process would lead to the re-emer-
gence of PTSD symptoms and intense feelings of 
anxiety and depression(8,9). This thesis explains 
the association between dementias and distressful 
intrusive memory in selected clinical populations, 
but it does not map the age-adjusted epidemiol-
ogy of the surge in late-onset PTSD. Empirical 
research published in the American Journal of Ge-
riatric Psychiatry, based on a large sample veterans 
in VA primary care clinics, indicates that older 
veterans (at-risk for dementias) self-report fewer 
PTSD symptoms and better mental health than 
do younger veterans(10). 
Malingering and PTSD
Thus two highly respected PTSD researchers, 
McNally and Frueh, were led to conclude that 
“financial need, not psychiatric disorder, is the 
primary driver of the skyrocketing rate of dis-
ability claims...,” and they cite an analysis of a 
“massive federal dataset” by labor economists(11) 
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nitive- and social-neuroscience rather than psy-
chiatry. In addition, this memory system, once 
taken seriously, would token a paradigm shift, 
followed inevitably by the devaluation of vast 
amounts of symbolic capital accumulated, mainly 
in the USA, since the publication of DSM-III. 
But we have yet to introduce you to the future-
thinking brain, also known as Bayesian brain and 
Helmholtzian brain.
This brain began with a puzzle, identified two 
decades ago. The human brain is a very expen-
sive organ, accounting for 20% of the body’s 
energy consumption. One might assume that 
energy consumption increases when the brain is 
engaged in stimulus-bound, goal-directed activ-
ity, yet consumption decreases. It increases in the 
‘default mode’, as the brain attends to internal 
neuronal traffic and ‘idle’ activities that include 
mind-wandering, stimulus-free thought, autobio-
graphical recollection, self-referential processing). 
Moreover, brain activity during these conditions 
is remarkably similar among individuals and be-
tween groups, so that researchers refer to a ‘de-
fault mode network’. 
The findings provoked the question: What is the 
brain doing when it is doing nothing? One solu-
tion, promoted by Karl Friston, is that the brain 
is dedicated to controlling ‘free energy’, defined 
as the consequence of prediction error, the fail-
ure of the brain to anticipate and order outcomes 
(see Apps and Tsakiris for a systematic review of 
publications relevant to psychiatry)(14). The free-
energy principle asserts that adaptive change in 
biological systems (including the central nervous 
system) aims to minimize surprise – that is, un-
predicted and un-interpretable feedback. Failure 
to limit surprise leads to a progressive increase in 
entropy (disorder) and violates the foundations 
of self-organization that are basic to biologi-
cal systems. The second law of thermodynamics 
contends that entropy is the fate of all closed sys-
tems. But Friston argues otherwise: the brain is 
a product of evolutionary adaptations, that these 
adaptations include the optimization of relations 
among neurons. Entropy is not the fate of the 
brain in the short-run.
malingerer’s conscious effort to deceive someone 
with his effort —conscious or unconscious— to 
deceive himself. Robert Trivers pursues the theme 
of other-deception and self-deception in a stream 
of books and articles beginning in the 1970s. His 
premise is that other-deception pervades all levels 
of life, down to the molecular determinants of liv-
ing matter; successful deception must evade ob-
stacles that evolved to thwart deception. Among 
humans, these evolved obstacles include the fear 
of being detected and the psychological cost of 
cognitive dissonance (conflict between someone’s 
subjective and asserted beliefs, perceptions, mo-
tives, etc.). The immediate cost of deception is 
added time and effort; the ultimate cost can be 
the subversion of the spontaneity, body language, 
and self-possession that are widely associated with 
truthfulness. 
Self-deception is a strategic adaptation to chal-
lenges emerging from other-deception. If we ac-
cept Trivers’ account, this is not exceptional be-
haviour: it is habitual human behaviour. This is a 
supremely interesting argument, but not because 
of any moral implications (which do not concern 
Trivers). It is interesting because the core activity 
of self-deception concerns memory-work: a two-
fold effort, first, to revise or reconstruct the past 
via a combination of imagination or editing, and 
a second effort to identify with one’s deception. 
The plausibility of Trivers’ thesis has grown over 
the last two decades, in tandem with the continu-
ing elaboration of the Bayesian Brain, the opera-
tions and reach of its Default Mode Network, 
and the clinical phenomenology of memories of 
the future. 
The Brain: a Bayesian Inference Machine? 
While considerable attention was given to the 
diagnostic significance of traumatic memory in 
the run-up to the publication of DSM-5 (2013), 
it focused mainly on the question of whether a 
memory criterion should be retained in PTSD’s 
symptom list. Traumatic memories of the future 
were entirely ignored. This lack of interest on the 
part of experts is understandable however. His-
torical memory of the century-old debates that 
had begun with Charcot had faded, and current 
interest in memories of the future and underlying 
memory-system had only just begun, and in cog-
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posterior cingulated cortex), memory (hippocam-
pus), and executive function (prefrontal cortex). 
The pattern is consistent with the free energy 
principle, and one can infer the (PTSD) brain’s 
diminished ability to optimize predictions. This 
interpretation is rarely made explicit however. 
Conclusions
When PTSD first appeared, in DSM-III (1980), it 
was imagined to be a normal response to extraor-
dinary situations. This was a strategic interpreta-
tion, intended to eliminate the constitutional fac-
tors that could undermine the service-connected 
entitlements claimed by affected veterans. Seven 
years later (DSM-IIIR), the formula was reversed 
in response to epidemiological research indicat-
ing that PTSD is an unusual response to distress-
ful situations that most people manage without 
pathological consequences. The change resur-
rected doubts regarding the diagnostic validity 
of chronic PTSD, whose symptoms are similar, 
if not identical, to its co-morbid disorders. One 
solution to this challenge would be evidence (bio-
markers) of a pathogenesis distinctive to PTSD. 
These biomarkers would perform a double ser-
vice, confirm PTSD’s validity and eliminate cases 
of malingering and factitious memory. 
Three decades after the publication of DSM-IIIR, 
we are still wait for convincing biomarkers. This 
paper provides an explanation and suggests a way 
to move forward: PTSD researchers might con-
sider adding a new brain, based on the principle 
of “predictive coding” thus replacing or marginal-
izing categorical conceptions of memory. Second, 
researchers might consider shifting their perspec-
tive on PTSD from exclusion to inclusion: away 
from the idea that cases based on malingered or 
factitious memories are necessarily external to the 
clinical phenomenon that we call “PTSD”.
 
Thus the human brain conforms to two, comple-
mentary principles: an evolutionary principle 
that defines adaptation as reproductive success, 
and a functional principle that defines adaptation 
as control over free energy and postponement of 
entropy. From a functional perspective, the brain 
is an inference machine. Memories of the past are 
a means for adjusting the machine, reducing pre-
diction error, by matching a predicted outcome 
to a recorded outcome and revising the predic-
tion (for the future) to reflect the calculation. 
The process is recursive: the brain is never at rest, 
notwithstanding references to a ‘resting state’. 
The so-called ‘forward motion model’, employed 
in cognitive and robotic sciences, operates in an 
analogous manner. 
In contrast to the evolutionary adaptations that 
help us to survive immediate threats, the func-
tional processes associated with the default mode 
network occur over long periods. “(We) spend 
most of our time directed away from the environ-
ment in processing modes that consolidate the 
past, stabilize brain ensembles, and prepare us for 
the future. Activity events supporting these (long-
term) functions may be structured in ways fun-
damentally different from those we have gleaned 
by studying input–output relations under imme-
diate experimental control”(15:1095). Empirical 
support for this line of reasoning and, by exten-
sion, the idea that traumatic memories are mem-
ories of the future that are enabled by memories 
of the past, can be found in current default mode 
research into schizophrenia and autism spectrum 
disorders.
In summary, ‘free energy’ is an index of disorder 
(entropy) and, by extension, pathology. The ex-
tent of free energy can be modeled mathematical-
ly, but not measured or visualized directly. Rather, 
it is inferred from images of the default mode 
network. I located and reviewed 26 fMRI studies 
(conducted between 2004 and 2014) of connec-
tivity in the default mode network. Individuals 
diagnosed with PTSD were compared with nor-
mal controls, and (occasionally) individuals with 
superficially similar psychiatric disorders, such as 
generalized anxiety disorder. Findings represented 
in these studies are generally similar, showing re-
duced connectivity in the PTSD group between 
brain regions identified with emotion (amygdala, 
70 
Culture, history, and traumatic memory: an interpretation - Allan Young
References
1. McNally RJ. Remembering Trauma. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press; 2003.
2. Hardt, O, Einarsson, EO, Nader, K. A bridge over troubled water: reconsolidation as a link between cognitive and 
neuroscientific memory research traditions. Annual Review of Psychology 2010; 61: 141-67.
3. Schacter DL, Addis DR, Hassibis D, Martin VC, Spreng RN, Szpunar KK. The future of memory: remembering, ima-
gining, and the brain. Neuron 2012; 76: 677-694.
4. Southwick SM, Andrew Morgan III CA, Nicolaou AL, Charney DS. Consistency of memory for combat-related trau-
matic events in veterans of Operation Desert Storm. American Journal of Psychiatry 1997; 154: 173-177.
5. VAOIG. Veterans Affairs Office of the Inspector General. Review of state variances in VA disability compensation payments. 
VAOIG Report 2005; 05-00765-137. Retrieved from http://www.va.gov/ foia/err/standard/requests/ig.html
6. Zarembo A. As disability awards grow, so do concerns with veracity of PTSD claims. Los Angeles Times 2014-08-03.
7. Frueh BC, Grubaugh AL, Yeager D E, Magruder KM. Delayed-onset posttraumatic stress disorder among veterans in 
primary care clinics. British Journal of Psychiatry 2009; 194: 515-520.
8. Grady CL, Furey ML, Pietrini P, Horwitz B, Rapoport SI. Altered brain connectivity and impaired short-term memory 
in Alzheimer’s disease. Brain 2001; 124: 739-756.
9. Grossman AB, Levin BE, Katzen HL, Lechner S. PTSD symptoms and onset of neurologic disease in elderly trauma 
survivors. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 2004; 26: 698-705
10. Frueh BC, Grubaugh AL, Acierno A, Elhai JD, Cain G, Magruder KM. Age differences in posttraumatic stress disor-
der, psychiatric disorders, and healthcare service use among veterans in Veterans Affairs primary care clinics. American 
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 2007; 15: 660-672.
11. Angrist JD, Chen SH, Frandsen BR. Did Vietnam veterans get sicker in the 1990s? The complicated effects of military 
service on self-reported health. Journal of Public Economics 2010; 94: 824-837.
12. McNally RJ, Frueh BC. Why are Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans seeking PTSD disability compensation at unpre-
cedented rates? Journal of Anxiety Disorders 2013; 27: 520-526.
13. Berry DTR, Nelson NW. DSM-5 and malingering: A modest proposal. Psychological Injury and Law 2010; 3: 295-303.
14. Apps MAJ, Tsakiris M. The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition. Neuroscience and Biobeha-
vioral Reviews 2014; 41: 85-97.
15. Buckner RL, Vincent JH. Unrest at rest: default activity and spontaneous network correlations. Neuroimage 2007; 37: 
1091-1996.
Bibliography
Breslau N, Davis GC. Post traumatic stress disorder: The stresspr criterion. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 1987; 175: 
255-264.
Coman A, Manier D, Hirst W. Forgetting the unforgettable through conversation: Socially shared retrieval-induced forget-
ting of September 11 memories. Psychological Science 2009; 20: 627-633. 
Mullally SL, Maguire EA. Memory, imagination, and predicting the future: a common brain mechanism? The Neuroscientist 
2014; 20: 220-234.
Von Hippel W, Trivers R. The evolution and psychology of self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2011; 34: 1-56. 
Young A. The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1995.
Young A, Breslau N. What is “PTSD”?: The Heterogeneity Thesis. In Hinton DG, Good GJ, eds. Culture and PTSD: Trauma 
in Global and Historical Perspective. Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; 2015: 135-154.
Received: February 2, 2016
Accepted: May 30, 2016
